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Sailing in the Shadow of the Vietnam War:
The GDR Government and the
“Vietnam Bonus” of the Early 1970s
Gerd Horten

ABSTRACT

In concert with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries, the East German
government vigorously opposed the Vietnam War in the 1960s and early 1970s
and supported North Vietnam politically and economically. Concurrently, it sponsored ongoing solidarity campaigns in support of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) against the US-led coalition. As the American war effort deteriorated,
the East German government reaped a significant boost both internationally and
domestically as a result of these campaigns. This “Vietnam Bonus” helped to
enhance the international stature of the GDR and increased the domestic stability
of the SED government in the early 1970s.

The Vietnam War provided the East German government with a golden opportunity.
No functionary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei
Deutschlands, SED) could have dreamed up a better script for the country’s Cold War
propaganda. It had all of the ingredients and characters for a gripping and winning
formula: an aggressive capitalist American intruder who became all the more menacing as the war went on; the evil West German ally who assisted the imperialist bully
and became implicated in its destructive actions; a socialist Vietnamese underdog
whom much of the world and the East German population eventually supported; and
a benevolent Soviet neighbor who supplied and aided the Vietnamese victim at the
same time as it was seeking to bring all sides to the negotiating table. Even the ongoing conflict between the two great Communist powers, China and the Soviet Union,
which intensified during the second half of the 1960s, could not spoil this powerful
narrative. While the GDR followed the lead of the Soviet Union and worked in close
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collaboration with its East Bloc allies, the propaganda value of the Vietnam War was
all too good to be true, and certainly too good to pass up.1
Best of all, unlike the building of the Berlin Wall, which was allegedly constructed
in 1961 to protect the East German population, or the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which was justified as brotherly assistance for a neighbor facing an
alleged threat of a “counterrevolution,” this Vietnam War narrative did not have to
be invented nor stubbornly defended against the better knowledge of an ever skeptical East German population. On this issue, the SED leadership would ultimately
be vindicated for its early condemnation of the war and joined by an ever-widening
number of Western media and publics as well. Not surprisingly then, its anti-Vietnam
stance and numerous Vietnam solidarity campaigns were one of the centerpieces
of its critique of the capitalist system and often functioned as a key linchpin in its
propaganda war against the imperialist West in the late 1960s and early 1970s. And
the longer the war lasted, the more convincing this narrative became.2
Even American officials had to concede that they had handed the East German
government an important strategic advantage. As a secret public opinion survey by
the United States Information Agency (USIA) highlighted, the Vietnam War proved
to be a trump card for the GDR propaganda war with East German audiences: “The
East German regime’s propaganda drumfire and its ‘solidarity’ meetings on VN [Viet
Nam] doubtless [sic] have had some impact, fostering the belief that the US is a
colonialist and imperialist power bent on squashing a legitimate national liberation
movement in SE Asia.” Equally importantly, it gave the SED regime a significant boost
in its standing with its own population, as the American survey emphasized: “While
East Germans are constitutionally skeptical of regime propaganda on all issues, the
official line may have more credibility on VN than all other issues. One of the main
counteracting sources of information for East Germans, Western TV, has not been
notably effective in presenting the US case.”3 And this assessment was reported in
1966, well before the American war effort deteriorated and in advance of increasing
reports of US war crimes in Vietnam, which would create strong worldwide opposition
and provide ever more fuel for the East German propaganda mill.
It is somewhat surprising how little the Vietnam War, specifically the consistent
and forceful opposition of the East German government to the war, has been incorporated into the overall historical scholarship of the GDR in the late 1960s and 1970s.4
Neither studies on the foreign relations of East Germany nor analyses of the domestic
politics of the SED government have paid this issue much attention.5 Likewise, even
scholars trying to understand and explain the relative longevity and stability of the
GDR have overlooked the Vietnam narrative as a contributing factor.6
In order to fully appreciate the political advantage which the Vietnam War provided for the GDR government, it is important to recognize the generally skeptical
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and distrustful attitude which the East German population had towards its political
leadership. As many historians have attested, the hold of the East German government
on its population was always a tenuous one and nowhere near as total as the term
“dictatorship” would imply—despite its elaborate surveillance and spying activities.
The SED leadership was generally resigned to the fact that most people withdrew
into their own personal spaces and condoned, for example, the routine consumption of Western media by the early 1970s as long as it did not challenge the political
order. Noncooperation, reluctant support for government initiatives and consistent
“grumbling” were part and parcel of daily life in the GDR and highlight this complex
social contract between the SED leadership and the people of East Germany.7
This article analyzes three layers of the East German antiwar and Vietnam solidarity campaigns. The most immediate criticism was aimed at the United States and
by extension West Germany, which according to GDR officials revealed their global
imperialist aspirations through their attack against a socialist country. Within these
campaigns, the harshest political attacks were often reserved for the West German
class enemy, who in the eyes of the East German government had created a special
alliance with the United States in order to carry out its capitalist revanchist strategy.
The second political layer of the GDR’s vigorous antiwar campaigns connected the
East German government with numerous international organizations and antiwar
movements. Primary among these efforts was the active participation and at times
leadership of the GDR in the yearly Stockholm antiwar conferences. The final key
target of the official antiwar propaganda was the East German population. Though
eternally skeptical of all official initiatives, large segments of the public supported
many of the Vietnam solidarity campaigns primarily in the second half of the war.
This was in no small measure due to the fact that the antiwar sentiment in the GDR
grew in the late 1960s just as it did in the rest of the world. Based on the documentary evidence, public support for Vietnam solidarity campaigns in the GDR peaked
between 1972 and 1975.
Finally, this article also addresses some of the complications and hurdles in the
path of this successful antiwar strategy, most notably the suppression of the Prague
Spring and the GDR’s support for and participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia
in early 1968. Yet despite this and other obstacles, the GDR’s anti-Vietnam activities
of the late 1960s and early 1970s consolidated the SED government’s international
status. Just as important, this “Vietnam Bonus” provided a significant boost to the
internal stability of the GDR in the early to mid-1970s, because East Germany’s early
opposition to the war was ultimately validated and because the Vietnam solidarity
campaigns were supported by increasing portions of the generally disaffected East
German population in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
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Layer 1: Exposing the True Intentions of
the American and West German Enemies
One of the great advantages of the Vietnam War for East Berlin, as the US analysis
emphasized, was that the escalating conflict merged so easily with some of the main
propaganda themes of East Germany’s Cold War rhetoric. One of the central ones
was that the United States was an imperialist power bent on economic exploitation
as well as world conquest and committed to subduing liberation movements in the
developing world.8
Not surprisingly, the GDR blasted the United States for its aggressive actions in
Vietnam with the onset of the war, as reflected in the coverage of Neues Deutschland,
East Germany’s main party newspaper. As early as August 1964, the newspaper
accused the United States of a “war of aggression” in connection with the Gulf of
Tonkin crisis and argued that President Johnson and the American Congress were
purposefully provoking a war in Vietnam. When the American Congress passed the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the GDR vigorously condemned the early bombing campaigns against North Vietnam, highlighted the worldwide protests against the US
actions, and solidly placed itself on the side of the North Vietnamese people in the
conflict.9 As might be expected, these harsh attacks against the US-led war increased
after 1965 as the American ground war intensified and the bombing raids escalated,
coinciding with heightened international criticism of the conflict and intensifying
solidarity campaigns and demonstrations in East Germany.
Even though the détente policies were gathering speed in the late 1960s, the
Vietnam War provided an easy target for steady propaganda against “barbaric Americans” and ongoing criticism against ruthless US attacks. The GDR interpreted the US
military campaigns in Vietnam and the eventual invasions in Cambodia and Laos as
part of a worldwide campaign of aggression and as a blatant attempt to halt communism’s historic march towards victory. Articles like those entitled “Adventurous Plans
of the Pentagon” or “Poison War Against Women and Children in South Vietnam”
ran continuously in the East German media through the late 1960s and beyond.
Likewise, East Germany eagerly followed the growing financial and economic difficulties which the United States encountered in its pursuit of the war and increasingly
merged coverage of America’s international aggression with reports on its domestic
conflicts and racial turmoil. Finally, it was of incalculable value to the GDR government that few of these stories had to be invented and that more and more Western,
and especially West German, media were seconding the East German point of view
by the late 1960s and especially in the early 1970s.10
The unrivaled strength of the Vietnam War narrative from an East German
perspective was that the SED leadership could simultaneously attack its two main
Cold War enemies: it easily lent itself for attacks against the imperialist motives of
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the United States, yet it was equally easy to implicate West Germany in this narrative.
By March 1966, Neues Deutschland escalated its rhetoric against the United States
and referred to Vietnam as a war of annihilation (Vernichtungskrieg). And as East
German journalists saw it, West Germany was providing both political and military
support for the US campaigns. As one article put it, “Even the bourgeois press has
to concede: Bonn is providing bombs for the dirty war in Vietnam! This naked fact
exposes that all the talk about ‘humanitarian aid’ is cynical double-talk.” The GDR
media increasingly focused on the escalation of the war, the use of poison gas, and
the increasing protests in both East and West in 1966. Meanwhile East Germany
portrayed itself as the true “German peace state,” offering support and assistance to
the innocent workers and farmers of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).11
Another continuous thread in the verbal assault against the West German neighbor
was the persistent innuendos hinting at the participation of German troops in Vietnam.
As early as June of 1965, East Germany was reporting that the West German army
(Bundeswehr) was preparing military missions. In addition to the financial and military
aid that West Germany was already providing, Neues Deutschland argued that the
Bonn government was just waiting for the “appropriate moment” when West German
soldiers would become engaged in the war. By March of 1966, the paper was referring
to detailed studies by West Germany’s armed forces which allegedly advocated for the
use of its troops in the Vietnam theater. The cited study recommended active West
German military participation in order to consolidate the alliance with the United
States.12 The fact that no such West German troops ever materialized and that the
Bonn government consistently rejected American requests for German boots on the
ground did not dissuade the ongoing use of these allegations.
The fact of the matter was that the East German government was well informed
about the extent of the West German support for South Vietnam as well as its relations
with the United States. In a detailed internal report from April 1966, for example, SED
officials highlighted especially the economic and humanitarian aid which the Bonn
government was providing the South Vietnamese government. The report conceded
that the direct benefits of the war for West Germany were rather minor. It highlighted
that the German economy had only marginally benefitted from the additional orders
which the increased US expenditures had created. There was no “Vietnam-Boom,”
nothing equivalent to the “Korea-Boom” which the West German economy allegedly
experienced in connection with the war in the early 1950s. Much of the support for
South Vietnam, moreover, had come in the form of food deliveries, medical supplies,
or by providing civilian internships to South Vietnamese students and trainees. In an
almost disappointed tone, the GDR officials had to admit in their report that “there
were no West German investments worth mentioning in South Vietnam.” Overall the
analysis concluded that while the German economic interests in the war were rather
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negligible, “the West German government viewed its support to South Vietnam as
moral assistance for the United States with the hope of shifting the balance of the
international system in favor of the imperialist forces.”13
Vietnam was seen as the latest example in a number of military campaigns which
defined this capitalist strategy. But, as one GDR historian argued, it took on a special
role because it was the most flagrant example of this neoimperialist campaign and
represented the “most horrific colonial warfare in human history.” Simultaneously,
it was seen as only one piece in America’s Cold War “strategy of roll-back,” through
which it was trying to thwart the blossoming of recently liberated, socialist states in
regions ripe for freedom and self-determination. Southeast Asia, together with Latin
America and Africa, was viewed as the latest and third front in this concerted global
US-led strategy.14
What is of course noticeable here is how closely these arguments overlapped with
the emerging critiques of the Vietnam War in Western Europe and in the United
States. As the war dragged on, growing segments of populations in Western countries
no longer viewed America through the lens of World War II liberator and protector of
democracy and freedom. The war slowly but surely eroded this attractive image and
put even the staunchest defenders of the United States on the defensive. After the
repeated and brutal bombing raids, after My Lai and the invasion of Cambodia, after
the use of napalm and other poison gases, who would want to defend this raging giant
seemingly bent on mindless destruction? By 1969, this shift in Western and world
opinion was widespread and endemic, and well known in Washington. A secret 1969
USIA public opinion survey captured this emerging global consensus: “The results
of the survey research provide a rather bleak picture,” the survey conceded. In all
regions of the globe, with the sole exception of some countries in Southeast Asia
such as Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, majorities in most countries of the
world wanted the United States to end the war in Vietnam and pull out its troops.15
However, the East German government reserved its most biting comments and
criticism for its West German adversary. It emphasized the fact that the Bonn government, even its widely respected Chancellor Willy Brandt, was a most compliant
ally supportive of America’s Vietnam War. Interpreting this acquiescence as steady
support for the United States policies, East Berlin ascribed West Germany a particularly significant role in the overall neoimperialist capitalist global strategy and liked
to refer to the “special alliance” (Sonderbündnis) between Washington and Bonn.
As a government-sponsored analysis put it, the “special alliance of the West German
and American imperialism . . . [represented] not only the longest and strongest, but
also the most aggressive union of economic and political interests.” Therefore, it was
no coincidence that the FRG quietly overlooked even the most egregious violations
of basic human rights and international laws in Vietnam and effectively had become
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the coconspirator of the United States in what the study referred to as “a ruthless
genocide.”16
West German politicians were quite aware that they were vulnerable to what
became known as the “guilt-by-association” argument (Mitschuld), but they felt that
they had little leeway to blunt these cutting attacks. They believed that the country
owed a great debt to the United States for its past assistance and knew that it continued
to rely on American protection more urgently than any other West European country.
In addition, the Brandt government was very aware that it needed US backing if it
wanted Ostpolitik to succeed. In short, because of its unique military and geostrategic
location as well as its own foreign relations initiatives, West Germany was trapped,
forced to stand side by side with an ever more unpopular America in a conflict the
world and its own population increasingly despised.17
Not surprisingly, this notion of West Germany as an accomplice and most trusted
ally in Vietnam remained a core element in East Germany’s Cold War battle and
seamlessly continued a key theme advanced by the SED government since the late
1940s. By the late 1960s, articles insinuating the shipment of West German poison
gas to Vietnam and Bonn’s willingness “to pay for the US war without reservation”
cemented and elaborated on the “guilt-by-association” argument—a charge which
became increasingly difficult to refute.18 In fact, by the early 1970s East Berlin took
this argument one step further arguing that West Germany was indeed enabling
the United States to keep fighting its war by providing the monetary resources to do
so. East German officials argued that this financial and monetary cover by the FRG
allowed the war to continue and was equivalent to financing all American military
operations in Vietnam during the year 1970.19
The question of “Who paid for Vietnam?” indeed became an explosive issue both
in East and West Germany in the final years of the war. The increasing cost of the war
significantly contributed to the United States’ worsening financial position, especially
its balance-of-payments deficit. Western European countries—West Germany in
particular—were securing the value of the US dollar through buying large amounts
of American reserves and refused to sell them even as the value of the dollar began
to decline, thus indirectly helping to finance the war. This was done with an implicit
understanding of the “Atlantic bargain,” by which the United States provided military
protection in exchange for international monetary support from its allies. As Hubert
Zimmermann highlights, in this way America’s allies helped finance the Vietnam
War through what he refers to as “an indirect ‘Vietnam tax.’” This indirect support
became especially apparent after consecutive devaluations of the dollar in the early
1970s, when the currency lost about forty percent of its value. Any country holding
US dollar reserves, with West Germany leading the pack, lost an equivalent share of
their dollar reserves. In a 1971 interview, the president of the German Central Bank
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Figure 1. GDR Vietnam Solidarity Exhibit, 1969 (Courtesy of BStU Archiv;
MfS-ZAIG-Fo-1361-Bild-0026)

remarked with regret: “We should have been more firm with the Americans.” That
same year, the left-leaning West German newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau put
the matter more bluntly and more in line with that of the East German government:
“Our economists and our banks know it, even though our politicians don’t want to
acknowledge it, but our country feels that we have paid a large portion of the senseless, murderous war in Vietnam and continue to do so.”20
East Berlin’s politicians and media frequently returned to these accusations. By the
summer of 1967, in articles such as “In Hitler’s Tracks,” Neues Deutschland compared
the “pacification attempts by South Vietnam and the United States to the early phase
of Hitler’s conquest.” A couple of weeks later it published a similar attack under the
heading, “The Nazi Cross on the US Dollar.” This latter article argued that the foreign
relations of the United States in Vietnam were littered with atrocious war crimes and
found their domestic equivalent in the ruthless exploitation and suppression of the
black minorities within its own borders. In all of this, the continued and steady West
German monetary support was of critical importance and deeply implicated the Bonn
government, as the writer emphasized.21
This fear of the resurgence of fascism as well as of once again failing the test of
history ran like a red thread through all of the West German protest movements and

Gerd Horten

565

the antiwar campaigns as well. As early as 1966 the West German antiwar movement
began to refer to the “American genocide in Vietnam” and drew direct connections
between the US atrocities committed in Vietnam and those carried out by the Nazis
during World War II. A poster distributed by the West German antiwar movement
in 1966 asked the poignant question: “How much longer will we allow murder to be
committed in our names?” As the American bombing campaigns kept rolling over
North Vietnam again and again, the events reminded Germans of their own ruined
cities and inevitably aroused sympathy for the innocent North Vietnamese victims
caught up in the inevitable slaughter.22 Moreover, the compelling rationale of the
antiwar protests was not to once again condone atrocities and war crimes but instead
to answer the call implied in the popular German protest slogan “He who keeps quiet
agrees.”23
In West Germany, the Tet Offensive and the revelations of the atrocities at My Lai
and other locations reported in 1969 caused a significant revision in media coverage,
but they were also deeply embedded in the domestic struggles of the FRG. Not only did
the ideological differences of the West German print media become more pronounced,
but more journalists were moving towards critical or even outright oppositional reporting starting in 1969. A final trope of reporting, which gained more currency in the
latter stage of the war, was the indirect and inadvertent blurring of Nazi war crimes
and American atrocities in Vietnam. The reports of the use of chemical warfare by
the United States, the barbaric bombing campaigns, and the mass killings of innocent
civilians by American GIs merged with the domestic discourse of German World War II
war crimes.24 In East and West Germany, the war in Vietnam was increasingly viewed
as unjustifiable, immoral and reprehensible by the late 1960s and early 1970s, giving
ever more sustenance to the concerted GDR antiwar campaigns.

Layer 2: Reaping the Political Rewards
of International Antiwar Collaboration
The manifold activities of the GDR Vietnam Committee were accompanied by a
flurry of international antiwar politics on the part of East Germany’s broader Solidarity Committee, which led to significant conferences both inside and outside of the
country. Most of the conferences hosted by the GDR itself focused on interpreting
the Vietnam War through a communist lens, which viewed it as part of a concerted
global imperialist campaign led by the United States meant to undermine the rise of
independent and socialist countries. The vast majority of these events were attended
by socialist or Warsaw Pact countries only. One such conference held in East Berlin
in February of 1969, for example, focused on the problems of the anti-imperialist
struggle in Asian countries. Of the roughly two hundred participants, forty-seven came
from abroad, but only five of them were from West European countries.25
Much more vital in terms of international cooperation and recognition was the
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increasing participation of the GDR in antiwar conferences held in West European
countries. Most significant among these were the annual Vietnam Conferences in
Stockholm, which first convened in 1966 and eventually gained broad-based international recognition and were later attended by national governmental representatives
as well. The GDR sent its first delegation in 1967 and gradually gained the respect
of the fellow attendees. In 1970, the GDR Vietnam Committee was invited to join
the Executive Committee of the Stockholm Vietnam Conference in recognition of its
numerous contributions to the international antiwar campaigns. Aside from monetary
and other donations, its scientific studies which proved the use of biological and
chemical warfare in Vietnam were seen as very influential contributions.26
Equally important was another venture which significantly added to the prestige
of the GDR in the international anti–Vietnam War movement: the powerful documentaries made by Studio H&S, named after the two documentary makers Walter
Heynowski and Gerhard Scheumann. During the heyday of its influence between the
mid-1960s and the late 1970s, this legendary team focused most of its films on biting
critiques against Western imperialism, especially the war in Vietnam, as well as attacks
against West Germany. While the documentaries were primarily made for domestic
consumption, many were purchased by news and TV organizations outside the East
Bloc and viewed in different parts of Western Europe and the developing world.27
The two most renowned early anti-imperialist and antiwar documentaries were
Der lachende Mann: Bekenntnisse eines Mörders (The Laughing Man: Confessions
of a Murderer) which aired in 1966 and Piloten im Pyjama (Pilots in Pajamas)
released in 1968. The first focused on a German Foreign Legionnaire, an ex-soldier
of the Wehrmacht from World War II, who had continued his murderous trade in
the name of anticommunism under the guise of Western imperialism in different
parts of the developing world. Pilots in Pajamas, by contrast, focused directly on the
United States and the Vietnam War. It consisted of interviews with ten American pilots
who had been shot down in attacks over North Vietnam. It was not their murderous
intent but rather their ordinary nature which was the focal point of the four-part
series. Important in a German context, like the defendants in the post–World War II
Nuremberg Trials, their default answer to the question of their motivation was that
they had simply followed orders when attacking targets in the DRV.28
East Germany also became especially involved in consecutive conferences which
focused on US war crimes in Indochina. After the initial one in Stockholm in 1970,
the next two were hosted by two NATO countries—Norway and Denmark—a point
which was not lost on SED officials. At the conference held in Oslo in June of 1971,
the GDR delegation distributed a powerful report on the use of herbicides by the
United States in Vietnam written by Gerhard Grümmer. The report detailed in
scientific yet accessible language the use of various herbicides (Agent Orange, Agent
Blue, and Agent White) and described the companies involved in the manufacture
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and distribution of the herbicides. It targeted powerful American corporations such
as Dow Chemical but also implicated segments of the West German BASF company.
The internal conference report emphasized that the GDR delegation came well
prepared for the deliberations and that its contributions were widely praised by the
participants.29
In the early 1970s, East Germany solidified its status as a reliable and constructive member of the international antiwar movement by faithfully attending both the
Stockholm conferences as well as subsequent meetings which focused on American
war crimes in Indochina. Through these activities and its development of antiwar
research and documentaries, the GDR also increasingly created pragmatic alliances
with West European antiwar organizations and became a significant distributor of
antiwar materials. By the early 1970s, the Vietnam Committee had established working
relationships with the British organization Medical Aid for Vietnam, the Dutch group
Medisch Comité Nederland, as well as the radical Austrian group Anti-Imperialist
Solidarity Committee (Antiimperialistisches Solidaritätskomitee). In addition to
supplying these organizations with antiwar literature and documentaries, the GDR
arranged for the transport of medical and blood donations from Western Europe and
included them as part of its own shipments to the DRV.30
Although none of these international activities led to long-term political alliances,
these policies and antiwar efforts on the part of the GDR garnered a great amount of
respect for the country and established it as a fellow leader in antiwar circles. And
as the movement against the war grew and as it attracted increasing numbers of
politicians especially to the Stockholm Vietnam Conferences in the early 1970s, East
Germany could delight both in the remarkable victory of the Vietnamese people against
overwhelming odds as well as the increasing recognition which its own contributions
yielded. It had established itself as an anti-imperialist champion in the eyes of many
Third World countries and had raised its status among many West European nations
as well.31 Despite all of its horrors and tragedies, the Vietnam War presented a longterm political advantage for the SED government.

Layer 3: Enjoying the Support of the East German Population
The official solidarity with North Vietnam began early in East Germany and well before
the American invasion. In the early 1950s, the two countries established diplomatic
relations, and East Germany soon began supporting the DRV with economic and
humanitarian aid. By 1957, East Germany was already the third-largest provider of
aid, behind China and the Soviet Union. In the early 1960s, East Germany was also
one of the first countries to recognize the South Vietnamese National Liberation
Front (NLF) and supported the rebel group with military aid.32
In July 1965, during the commemoration of the eleventh anniversary of the Geneva
Accords which ended the French Indochina War in 1954, the GDR g overnment

568

German Studies Review 36 /3

• 2013

announced the creation of the Vietnam Committee (Vietnam Ausschuss). This committee was established as part of the larger Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (AfroAsiatisches Solidaritätskomitee), which had been created in 1963 and which would
be renamed the Solidarity Committee of the GDR (Solidaritätskomitee der DDR) in
early 1973. The Vietnam Committee was the main hub of the antiwar efforts in the
GDR throughout the 1960s and the 1970s and coordinated the numerous government
campaigns as well as aligned them with the overall foreign relations policies of the
SED government and those of the East Bloc countries.33
To be sure, it is no easy task to assess the true degree of public support for the
Vietnam solidarity campaigns which were rolled out over the next decade and more.
As many historians have attested, it is always difficult to get a reliable read on the
public opinion in the GDR. Even when statistics and public opinion reports are available, they are fraught with potential pitfalls and complications. While East Germans
were frequently surprisingly frank in their complaints and disagreements, everyone
understood that there were limits to the degree of grumbling which the state tolerated
and penalties attached to excessive noncooperation and outright opposition. East
Germans knew to be circumspect in voicing their true opinions for fear of jeopardizing
their career opportunities or just the chance of receiving a new apartment or other
favors from state officials. Therefore, “double-talk” was widespread and an essential
aspect of living within the confines of the East German state.34
Despite this caveat, the main trend lines of the popular support for the Vietnam
solidarity campaigns do emerge from documentary sources. They show that the East
German public was uncooperative or resistant to most official campaigns in the early
years of the war in the mid-1960s. Like much of the rest of the world, the sentiment
began to change in the late 1960s, however, as many East Germans became incensed
by the war and were willing to do more to support the North Vietnamese people. This
public antiwar mood and support for the solidarity campaigns reached their peak in
the early 1970s, especially in 1972 and 1973, when the relentless US bombing raids
and the eventual withdrawal of American troops further heightened support for the
DRV underdog. The certainty of a DRV victory assured high interest until 1975, when
the war’s immediacy began to fade despite the best efforts of the GDR government to
keep its memory relevant and alive. In general, then, especially when compared with
other government initiatives, the Vietnam solidarity campaign was rather successful
overall. As Hermann Schwiesau, a long-time leading official in the East German
foreign office and GDR ambassador to several countries, recalled after the fall of the
Berlin Wall: “This was a unique solidarity campaign in GDR history in terms of its
breadth, longevity and volume . . . . The willingness to donate on the part of the GDR
population surpassed all previous campaigns.”35
Based on the reports of the Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, MfS or Stasi), this support was rather halting in the initial years of the war.
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Across the GDR, the official calls for solidarity donations largely went unanswered
especially between 1964 and 1967. A Stasi official in Leipzig reported this broad negative sentiment in his district in August of 1966: “The missing sense of solidarity with
and disinterest towards the Vietnamese people is predominant based on the unofficial
reactions of all population groups—even among some comrades.”36 Frequently such
rejections were justified with comments by East Germans that they did not want to
unnecessarily prolong the war or simply that Vietnam was none of their business. At
the same time, some requests for blood donations also revealed racist resentment,
such as not wanting to provide “the yellow race with white blood.” And when the
Warsaw Pact countries met in Bucharest in July of 1966 and opened the door to possibly sending military volunteers to Vietnam, the GDR public response was especially
loud and unanimous in opposition to such an initiative.37
As might be expected, reports of negative responses remained part of the mix for
the duration of the war well into the mid-1970s, yet the public lack of cooperation
noticeably decreased towards the end of the decade parallel to the increased international antiwar opposition. By 1970, Stasi officials reported a far greater willingness to
donate time and money to the solidarity campaigns as well as increased and more vocal
opposition to the war. In fact, at times positive reports came in the form of criticisms,
as in the case of one collective which had produced motorcycles through overtime as
a direct donation to the DRV; yet they stood uncollected in the parking lot and were
rusting away. By early 1973, one district official reflected the changing mood of the
population at the official end of the war: “The first reports after the signing of the
end of the Vietnam War make it clear that the public is following these events with
great interest and that they are welcomed unanimously.”38
In addition, the monthly reports from the districts corroborated the notion that
the GDR public had become far more involved in the solidarity campaigns by the early
1970s. Reports from Dresden, for example, highlighted an ever-growing willingness
to participate in the donation campaigns and referred to “thousands of new acts of
solidarity and donation campaigns.” As one report from February 1973 summed up
the situation, “The ever-widening solidarity movement is especially evident because
many workers are willing to donate between 1–5% of their yearly bonus and an ever
larger number have increased their monthly solidarity donations.”39 The same was
true for Leipzig, where increasing segments of the population strongly condemned the
renewed US bombing raids in 1972 and where numerous local solidarity campaigns
were underway in late 1972 and 1973.40
These reports also correspond with the overall increase in public donations over
the decade between 1966 and 1975. The yearly public donations amounted to roughly
16 million Marks in 1966 and more than doubled by 1968. They reached a new peak
in 1973, with more than 48 million, and almost doubled again by 1975 to a total of
83 million Marks. Even though these donations always made up only a small portion
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Figure 2. Vietnam Protest Demonstration in East Berlin, Unter den Linden, late 1968
(Courtesy of BStU Archiv; MfS-OTS-Fo-0055-Bild-0002)

of the overall government aid provided to the DRV, they are notable for their sizes as
well as their increases over the years.41
Individual groups and organizations frequently participated in the antiwar solidarity campaigns as well. The Writers Association underwrote campaigns such as “Schools
for Vietnam” or “Health for Vietnam” while the GDR churches combined their efforts
under the banner of Bread for the World and donated 500,000 Marks towards the
reconstruction and equipment of the hospital in Viet-Duc in the DRV in 1971 alone.
Equally important was the establishment of an orthopedic center in North Vietnam,
which, though delayed until 1975, would ultimately provide prosthetics for thousands
of Vietnamese bombing victims.42 East German musicians organized the collection of
musical instruments for the Hanoi Symphony, and the GDR Farmers Congress alone
raised 6.5 million Marks in addition to the donation of farm tools and equipment.43
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By early 1973, GDR officials working in the Solidarity Committee of the GDR
felt decidedly more upbeat about the reception of their campaigns than they had at
the beginning of the war. Especially after the agreement to end the war in Vietnam
was signed in January of 1973, they noted an especially “lively echo” among the
East German population and “an even wider expansion of the solidarity movement.”
After listing all the various past and present campaigns on behalf of the Vietnamese
people, the Committee also committed itself to bringing 10,000 North Vietnamese to
the GDR by the end of the decade in order to help with the education and training
of the population as well as the rebuilding of the country after the devastating war.44
By contrast, the solidarity campaigns seemed to once again lose much of their
popular appeal in the second half of the 1970s after the end of war despite the Vietnam
Committee’s attempts to keep the legacy of the exemplary anti-imperialist struggle of
the Vietnamese people alive. Part of this government strategy was a renaming campaign which had started in the late 1960s. Collectives, schools, and other organizations
were encouraged to adopt the name of Vietnamese heroes in order to keep the struggle
of the DRV present in the daily life of the GDR. By the late 1970s, these efforts were
especially focused towards the primary and secondary schools in East Germany both
in terms of renaming schools and shaping the curricular as well as the extracurricular
activities for students who came of age after the Vietnam War had ended. The goal of
these governmental efforts was to use the memory of the war for “the mobilization of
students in order to make them familiar with the Vietnamese struggle and strengthen
the notion of the [international] solidarity movement.”45 Yet most of the GDR public
seemed to have moved on in the second half of 1970s, preoccupied with more pressing and immediate issues like the Biermann case, expatriations, ever more onerous
economic shortages, as well as the 1976 Montreal Olympics.

Complications and Obstacles to East Germany’s
Vietnam Solidarity Campaigns
While the East German government was able to utilize the anti-Vietnam War rhetoric
in a number of ways, and while there was some significant political convergence
between the criticism in the West and some of the Communist positions, this did
not mean that the East Berlin propaganda offensive was without complications or
setbacks. These can only be addressed briefly within the confines of this article.
The first tension was that the two main imperialist foes, West Germany and the
United States, retained their seductive appeal during this time period. If anything,
the election of Brandt in 1969 and the implementation of Ostpolitik lengthened the
shadow that West Germany threw over its East German neighbor. The GDR public
admired Willy Brandt personally and was quite attracted to his government’s form of
social democracy. The monthly reports in the GDR are filled with warnings of “the
lack of ideological clarity” on the part of the East German public and references to
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“illusions” about the true intentions of the FRG government under Brandt. Reading
these reports, one comes away with a strong sense that most East Germans would
rather have lived under a Brandt than an Ulbricht or a Honecker government.46
The United States, though much further removed and more abstract, maintained
its symbolical appeal for freedom and unfulfilled East German desires despite the
war in Vietnam. Especially the “other America,” the one which protested the war and
expressed this opposition in music and films, never lost its magnetic force in the GDR.
United States politics, on the one side, and American culture and aesthetic values
and habitus, on the other, frequently inhabited two different spheres for ordinary
East Germans, and the late 1960s and early 1970s were no exception.47
Another part of this complication of East Germany’s antiwar narrative was the
fact that East Berlin was trying to engage its primary Cold War enemy, the United
States, in negotiations starting in the mid-1960s. These diplomatic overtures were,
of course, not shared with the public at large. The twin goals of this campaign were
to reap concrete economic trade benefits as well as to lobby for the international
recognition of the GDR. Since the United States and East Germany did not establish
official diplomatic relations until 1974, these attempts were carried out through a
number of indirect and unofficial channels. For example, East Germany encouraged
and welcomed an increasing number of American visitors to the Leipziger Messe in
the second half of the 1960s. In addition to its contacts to the American Communist
party, the SED government also approached a number of left-leaning political groups
in the hopes of establishing more political leverage. Increased calls for the exchange
of scientists were part of this concerted GDR overture as well. However, very little
came of these undertakings, since the United States viewed East Germany as one of
the least flexible of the East European regimes and because it made its relationship
with the GDR completely subservient to its infinitely more vital ties with its West
German ally.48
Far more challenging for the East German Vietnam narrative than these external
tensions was the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the GDR’s support role in ending the
Prague Spring. Nobody in East Germany bought the official line that the invasion was
necessary in order to subdue an attempted “counterrevolutionary plot” in the CSSR.
The brutal crushing of the democratic uprising in Czechoslovakia and the participation of East German troops in the invasion caused widespread protests in the GDR,
but this opposition did not coalesce into an organized movement even though there
were signs of protest everywhere. Only 20 out of 180 students at the University of
Greifswald, for example, were willing to sign the Declaratory Acts which supported the
invasion into Czechoslovakia. All over the country, young people spontaneously used
graffiti and slogans like “Long live Dubc=ek—Freedom for Czechoslovakia” to express
their solidarity with the Czech uprising. Work stoppages by East German workers and

Gerd Horten

573

leaflet campaigns by students were further signs of the large-scale discontent with East
Germany’s obedient and hypocritical support for Moscow’s strong-armed tactics.49
The invasion of the CSSR also seriously impacted the activities of the World Peace
Council (WPC), which had evolved through the combined efforts of the East and
West European Communist parties in the postwar period. The Vietnam War clearly
provided a great opportunity to expand these activities across the East-West divide, and
for a while the Council in fact functioned as a two-way information exchange between
communist Eastern Europe and like-minded groups in the West. The East German
chapter, the German Peace Council, had the strong backing of the SED government,
but it was also a staunch supporter of Moscow and its political priorities. While it was
successful in organizing solidarity activities for the DVR, the World Peace Council
ultimately failed in effectively crossing borders because of its ideological rigidity and
adherence to Soviet policies. The decisive break with Western organizations came in
connection with the Warsaw Pact invasion in Czechoslovakia. As Günter Wernicke
put it: “The Prague Spring of 1968 marked the watershed, despite the attempts of the
WPC to polish its image in the 1970s . . . . It sealed the WPC’s fate as an instrument
subject to the overriding influence of Soviet foreign policy.”50
A third major complication of East German antiwar propaganda strategy was the
personal contact, or lack thereof, between the North Vietnamese guest students and
workers and the GDR population. At best, North Vietnamese were tolerated in the
GDR and at worst rejected by the GDR public at large. Despite the lofty rhetoric of
aiding a brother country, North Vietnamese students and trainees in the GDR were
relegated to a second-class status. This had as much to do with public resentment
as with enforced North Vietnamese guidelines. Fearful that their fellow countrymen
might grow soft or might adopt East Germany’s official anti-Chinese political stance,
North Vietnamese officials closely supervised their comrades in the GDR and discouraged fraternization between them and their East German hosts. Not only personal
interactions but also bourgeois pleasures like going to the movies and other cultural
events were strongly discouraged. East Germans, for their part, increasingly began
to view their Vietnamese guests both as financial burdens and—similar to their Polish neighbors—competitors for scarce consumer products. This latter accusation
became far more pronounced in the late 1970s and 1980s, as more Vietnamese guest
workers were brought to the GDR in order to compensate for the lack of workers in
East Germany.51

Conclusion
Despite these various cross currents, the activities surrounding the Vietnam War were
a significant net plus for the East German government in its Cold War battle against
the West. First, it provided the SED leadership with significant support for its long-held
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claim that the United States was a capitalist octopus set on strangling nascent socialist
regimes. Likewise, the antiwar rhetoric opened up numerous venues to implicate the
West German capitalist adversary and to put the Bonn government on the defensive.
Second, it allowed the GDR to join and at times lead the burgeoning international
opposition to the Vietnam War, which included not just the usual Communist allies
but found receptive audiences in Western Europe and the developing world as well.
Finally, unlike many other official campaigns, the opposition to the Vietnam War was
backed by large segments of the East German population and somewhat lessened
their disaffection from the SED government.
As several historians have reminded us, within the lifespan of East Germany
there were always periods when the GDR was more stable and when the compromise between “passive conformity and leaving politics to the party” was more widely
accepted. Mary Fulbrook argues that “this compromise was, very nearly, achieved—
perhaps for the space of two or three years in the early to mid-1970s.” Marc-Dietrich
Ohse concurs and even goes so far as to call the early 1970s the “golden years” of the
GDR. In his recollections, Christoph Dieckmann similarly refers to 1973 as the time
of “the closest relationship between the government and the [East German] youth.”52
While the population never accepted the SED government as legitimate, there
were numerous reasons for the increased identification with the GDR during these
years: the strengthening of the party apparatus and the Stasi, to be sure, but also rising living standards, greater cultural tolerance, and increased travel within the East
Bloc; the stellar victories at the 1972 Munich Olympics and increased international
acceptance also added to this increased conformity with the East German state.53
The relatively effective anti-Vietnam War and solidarity campaigns as well as the
resulting “Vietnam Bonus,” as this article argues, were another important cause for
this greater stability of the GDR in the early 1970s.
Concordia University, Portland, Oregon
Notes
1. For good overviews of the international history of the Vietnam War, see two collections of essays:
International Perspectives on Vietnam, ed. Lloyd C. Gardner et al. (College Station: Texas
A&M University Press, 2000) and America, the Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and
International Perspectives, ed. Andreas W. Daum et al. (Publications of the German Historical
Institute; Washington D.C.: Cambridge University Press, 2003). The Soviet Union’s policies
towards Vietnam are discussed in Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago:
Ivan R. Dee, 1996) and Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to
the Fall of the Wall (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), chapters 8 and 9.
2. On the Berlin Wall, see Patrick Major, Behind the Berlin Wall: East Germany and the Frontiers
of Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), chapters 5 and 6. On the supposed “counterrevolutionary threat” of the Prague Spring, see Manfred Wilke, “Ulbricht, East Germany, and
the Prague Spring,” in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968, ed. Günter Bischof et al. (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2010), 341–70.

Gerd Horten

575

3. “Vietnam and World Opinion: Analysis and Recommendations,” August 1966, National Archives
RG 306, USIA, Office of Research, folder “Special Reports, 1964–1982.”
4. The two notable exceptions are Günter Wernicke, “Solidarität hilft siegen!”: Zur Solidaritätsbewegung mit Vietnam in beiden deutschen Staaten: Mitte der 60er bis Anfang der 70er Jahre
(Hefte zur DDR-Geschichte 72; Berlin, 2001) and Nguyen van Huong, “Die Politik der DDR
gegenüber Vietnam und den Vertragsarbeitern aus Vietnam sowie die Situation der Vietnamesen
in Deutschland heute,” in: Materialien der Enquete-Kommission “Überwindung der Folgen der
SED-Diktatur im Prozess der deutschen Einheit,” ed. Deutscher Bundestag, Bd. VIII, 2 (BadenBaden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995), 1301–63.
5. Even fine and well-received studies have largely overlooked this topic. See, for example, Hermann
Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen: Die DDR im internationalen System, 1949–1989
(Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2007) or Marc-Dietrich Ohse, Jugend nach dem Mauerbau: Anpassung,
Protest und Eigensinn (DDR 1961–1974) (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2003).
6. For an excellent overview of these studies, see Andrew Port’s introduction entitled “The Puzzle
of Stability” in his book Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 1–10.
7. Konrad H. Jarausch, ed., Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the
GDR (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), Introduction and chapter 3; Jeannette Z. Madarász,
Conflict and Stability in East Germany, 1971–1989: A Precarious Stability (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003); Corey Ross, The East German Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the
Interpretation of the GDR (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), chapter 5; and Ehrhart
Neubert, Geschichte der Opposition in der DDR, 1949–1989 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische
Bildung, 2012).
8. For succinct surveys, see Christian M. Ostermann, “Die USA und die DDR,” in Die DDR und
der Westen: Transnationale Beziehungen, 1949–1989, ed. Ulrich Pfeil (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2001),
165–83, and Dorothee Wierling, “Amerikabilder in der DDR,” in Umworbener Klassenfeind: Das
Verhältnis der DDR zu den USA, ed. Uta A. Balbier et al. (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2006), 32–38.
9. “USA-Bomben auf Vietnam,” Neues Deutschland, 6 August 1964, cover page. Side-by-side articles
on US atrocities and GDR solidarity early on became a standard feature of this reporting style:
see articles “USA geben Urheberrolle zu” and “DDR an der Seite Vietnams,” Neues Deutschland,
8 August 1964, cover page. Both articles were bracketed by the heading: “Weltweite Protestwelle
gegen die amerikanische Aggression.”
10. For an overall GDR assessment of the US international policies in connection with Vietnam, see
“Ziele und Auswirkungen der Aggression der USA in Indochina,” June 1965–May 1970, Abteilung
USA des Ministeriums für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR, C 506/74. The two articles were
both published in Neues Deutschland, 20 July 1968 and 13 August 1968, respectively.
11. The quote is from the article, “Amerikaner führen Vernichtungskrieg in Südvietnam,” Neues
Deutschland, 8 March 1966. The use of poison gases is discussed in the front page article on 11
March 1966. For a typical portrayal of East Germany as the peaceful of the two nations, see front
page article, 13 March 1966. All translations are my own.
12. “Bundeswehreinsatz in Südvietnam wird vorbereitet,” 19 June 1965, and “Sensationelle Studie
über die Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an USA-Aggression in Vietnam,” 19 March 1966, both in
Neues Deutschland.
13. “Das ökonomische Engagement der BRD im Zusammenhang mit der USA-Aggression in Südvietnam,” 2 April 1966, Abteilung USA des Ministeriums für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der
DDR, A 18325.
14. Horst Rennhack, BRD-Imperialismus: Komplice der USA-Aggressoren in Indochina (Berlin:
Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1973), 9–24; the quotes are on pages 9
and 15.

576

German Studies Review 36 /3

• 2013

15. “Current Climate of Foreign Opinion on Viet-Nam,” 21 April 1969, National Archives RG 306,
Records of the US Information Agency, Office of Research, folder “Special Reports, 1964–1982.”
16. Rennhack, BRD-Imperialismus, 27.
17. For a discussion of the “guilt-by-association” argument and dispute, see Alexandra Friedrich,
“Awakenings: The Impact of the Vietnam War on West German-American Relations in the late
1960s” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Temple University, 2000), chapters 3 and 4. On the broader tensions
created by the war, see Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German
Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), chapter 9. Brandt’s strong misgivings
about the war are discussed by Peter Merseburger in Willy Brandt, 1913–1992: Visionär und
Realist (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2006), 554–63.
18. See articles in Neues Deutschland, “FNL brandmarkt Mitschuld Bonns,” 1 September 1966;
“Bonn will weiterhin rückhaltslos für den USA-Krieg zahlen,” 6 January 1968; and “Ein System
und seine Methoden,” 9 January 1971.
19. Rennhack, BRD-Imperialismus, 98–113.
20. Hubert Zimmermann, “Who Paid for America’s War?,” in America, the Vietnam War, and the
World ed. Daum et al., 170 and 172. The quote from the Frankfurter Rundschau is cited in
Rennhack, BRD-Imperialismus, 113.
21. “Auf Hitler’s Spuren,” Neues Deutschland, 27 July 1967 and “Das Hakenkreuz auf dem Dollar,”
Neues Deutschland, 6 August 1967.
22. Nick Thomas, Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A Social History of Dissent and
Democracy (Oxford: Berg Publishing, 2003), 73.
23. Wilfried Mausbach, “Auschwitz und Vietnam: West German Protest Against America’s War
During the 1960s,” in America, the Vietnam War, and the World, ed. Daum et al., 286. See also
Quinn Slobodian’s excellent study, Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), especially chapter 3.
24. Anita Eichholz, Der Vietnamkrieg im SPIEGEL: Eine inhaltsanalytische Untersuchung (Berlin:
Verlag Volker Spiess, 1979), 74–86 and 164–69. On this overall shift in attitudes towards the
war, see also Joachim Arendt, Johnson, Vietnam, und der Westen: Transatlantische Beziehungen,
1963–1969 (Munich: Olzog, 1994) and Gerd Horten, “The Mediatization of War: A Comparison of
the American and German Media Coverage of the Vietnam and Iraq Wars,” American Journalism:
A Journal of Media History 28, no. 4 (2011): 29–54.
25. “Bericht über die Woche wissenschaftlicher Tagungen und Kolloquien,” 6 March 1969, Stiftung
Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bunderarchiv [hereafter SAPMOBArch], DZ 8/139. The forty-seven foreign participants came from eighteen different countries;
of the five from the West, two each came from Italy and Great Britain and one from Belgium.
26. Wernicke, “Solidarität hilft siegen!,” 19 and 54.
27. For good overviews of these films and the Studio H&S, see Rüdiger Steinmetz, “Heynowski &
Scheumann: the GDR’s leading documentary team,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 24, no. 3 (2004): 365–79, and Nora Alter, Projecting History: German Nonfiction Cinema,
1967–2000 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), chapter 1.
28. Steinmetz, “Heynowski & Scheumann,” 370–74. On the reception of the films in Western Europe,
see also Mogens Rukov, “Respekt vor der Autorität der Tatsachen: Zur Rezeption der H&S-Filme
in Westeuropa,” in Dokument und Kunst: Vietnam bei H&S. Eine Werkstatt-Ein Thema-Elf JahreDreizehn Filme (Berlin: Akademie der Künste der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1977),
37–40. These and other documentaries focused on the Vietnam War and American atrocities were
also a central focal point of the well-known annual International Documentary Film Festival in
Leipzig in the late 1960s and early 1970s; see Victor Grossman, “Sauerstoff im stickigen Leipzig:
Eindrücke eines US-Amerikaners von der Internationalen Dokumentarfilmwoche in Leipzig,” in
Umworbener Klassenfeind, ed. Balbier et al., 180–91.
29. Gerhard Grümmer, “Herbizide in Vietnam (Teil 1),” published in wissenschaft und fortschritt

Gerd Horten

30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.

38.

39.
40.
41.
42.

43.
44.

45.
46.
47.

577

20, no. 3 (1970), SAPMO-BArch; DZ 8/106. For the report on the 1971 conference, see “Information über die 2. Sitzung der Internationalen Kommission zur Untersuchung amerikanischer
Kriegsverbrechen in Indochina (Oslo 20.–24. Juni 1971),” SAPMO-BArch, DZ 8/129.
For the request by the British and Dutch medical groups, see memo of 30 June 1971; the letter
by Medical Aid for Vietnam (6 July 1970) is in the same folder: SAPMO-BArch, DZ 8/155.
For the GDR’s raised status in Africa in the 1970s, see Gareth M. Winrow, The Foreign Policy
of the GDR in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chapter 3. As Young-Sun
Hong has pointed out, this rivalry of the GDR versus the United States and West Germany also
extended into the developing world: “Kalter Krieg in der Ferne: Dekolonisierung, Hygienediskurs
und der Kampf der DDR und der USA um die Dritte Welt,” in Umworbener Klassenfeind, ed.
Balbier et al., 77–94. Finally, in her article “Die Westpolitik der DDR (1966–1989),” Marianne
Howarth argues that the immediate years after 1973 represented “[eine] Phase [der] Blütezeit
ihrer Diplomatie und ihrer auswärtigen Politik” for the SED; in Die DDR und der Westen, ed.
Pfeil et al., 89.
Van Huong, “Die Politik der DDR gegenüber Vietnam,” 1304–11.
Günter Wernicke, “Solidarität hilft siegen!,” 14.
Port, Conflict and Stability, chapter 5; Major, Behind the Berlin Wall, chapter 6; and Ohse,
Jugend nach dem Mauerbau, 287–95.
Siegfried Bock, Ingrid Muth, und Hermann Schwiesau, eds., DDR-Aussenpolitik im Rückspiegel:
Diplomaten im Gespräch (Münster: LIT, 2004), 287.
For the Leipzig report, see Bundesbeauftragter für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes
der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [hereafter BStU], BVfS Leipzig, AKG
00312/02, 29 August 1966.
Comments like these, especially the one about not wanting to prolong the war, were frequent
among those who did not participate in the solidarity campaigns. For other examples, see BStU,
MfS, BV Berlin, AKG 441, 10 August 1967 and BStU, Chemnitz, AKG 7399, 12 September 1966.
The racist rejections seemed far less frequent by comparison; for an example, though, see BStU,
BVfS Leipzig, AKG 00313/01, 18 January 1967.
For the complaint, see BStU Chemnitz, AKG 8255, 8 January 1970. See also BStU, MfS, BV
Berlin, Abteilung VIII, 363, 11 May 1972 and BStU, MfS, SED-KL 2079, 10 May 1972. The quote
is from BStU Chemnitz, AKG 8849, 29 January 1973.
SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/2211; the quotes are from the monthly reports from Dresden from 8 January 1972 and 27 February 1973, respectively.
SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/2260; see reports from 2 June 1972 and 1 October 1973.
Van Huong, “Die Politik der DDR gegenüber Vietnam,” 1312–14.
On the church’s participation, see the correspondence between Oberlandeskirchenrat von Brück
and Zahlbaum, 27 August–20 December 1971; the writers campaign is discussed in two appeals:
“Schulen für Vietnam” and “Gesundheit für Vietnam”; for the orthopedic campaign, finally, see
the report by the head of the Orthopädie Technik Berlin, 24 July 1975, all in SAPMO-BArch, DZ
8/146.
“Faktenmaterial über die Vietnam-Solidarität der DDR-Bevölkerung,” 25 April 1973, and memo
to Kurt Krüger, Vietnam Committee, 15 August 1974, SAPMO-BArch, DZ 8/123.
The quote is from the report “Faktenmaterial über die Vietnam-Solidarität der DDR-Bevölkerung,”
25 April 1973, and the projection from a report from 15 August 1974, both in SAMPO-BArch;
DZ 8/123.
“Aktennotiz über den Erfahrungsaustausch mit Schulen, die einen vietnamesischen Ehrennamen
tragen,” Vietnam-Ausschuss, 23 November 1978, SAPMO-BArch, DZ 8/157.
See, for example, reports of 13 March 1972 and 2 June 1972, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/2243 or
reports of 15 November 1972 and 2 April 1973, SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/2219.
See Therese Hörnigk and Alexander Stephan, Jeans, Rock und Vietnam: Amerikanische Kultur

578

48.

49.

50.
51.

52.

53.

German Studies Review 36 /3

• 2013

in der DDR (Berlin: Theater der Zeit, 2002) and the essays by Edward Larkey and Heiner Stahl
on American and Western pop music in Umworbener Klassenfeind, ed. Balbier et al., 232–60.
See several articles in Umworbener Klassenfeind, ed. Balbier et al.: Philip Matthes, “David und
Goliath,” 40–58; Stefan Meining, “Unerfüllte Träume: Erich Honecker, die jüdische Wiedergutmachungsfrage und die USA,” 59–76; and Jens Niederhut, “Unpolitische Beziehungen: Der
Wissenschaftleraustausch der USA mit der DDR,” 123–43.
The alleged counterrevolutionary threat is discussed by Wilke, “Ulbricht, East Germany, and
the Prague Spring,” in The Prague Spring, ed. Bischof et al., 341–70. For the public response,
see Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949–1989 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 193–200; the quote is on page 197.
Günter Wernicke, “The World Peace Council and the Antiwar Movement in East Germany,” in
America, the Vietnam War, and the World, ed. Daum et al., 314.
Van Huong, “Die Politik der DDR gegenüber Vietnam,” 1325–36, and Jonathan R. Zatlin: “Scarcity
and Resentment: Economic Sources of Xenophobia in the GDR, 1971–1989,” Central European
History 40, no. 4 (2007): 683–720. This move towards contract labor in the GDR in the 1970s
was part of a larger shift in development aid, as Young-Sun Hong has pointed out. See his article
“‘The Benefits of Health Must Spread Among All’: International Solidarity, Health, and Race in
the East German Encounter with the Third World,” in Socialist Modern: East German Everyday
Culture and Politics, ed. Katherine Pence et al. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,
2008), 183–210.
Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, 141; Ohse, Jugendbau nach dem Mauerbau, 281;
and Christoph Dieckmann, “Küche, Kammer, Weite Welt: Mythen der Erinnerung,” in Bye Bye
Lübben City: Bluesfreaks, Tramps, und Hippies in der DDR, ed. Michael Rauhut et al. (Berlin:
Schwarzkopf & Schwarzkopf, 2009), 22.
For a discussion of the political and economic factors, see Major, Behind the Berlin Wall, chapters
5 and 6; Ohse, Jugend nach dem Mauerbau, chapter 5; Madarász, Conflict and Compromise in
East Germany, chapter 2; and Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen, 391–459. On the 1972
Olympics, see Uta A. Balbier, Kalter Krieg auf der Aschenbahn: Der deutsch-deutsche Sport,
1952–1972: Eine politische Geschichte (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007), chapters 4
and 5.

Contributors
(ghorten@cu-portland.edu) is Professor of History at Concordia
University—Portland, Oregon. He teaches American and international/transnational
history and is the author of Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda
during World War II (2002). He is currently working on a study on American-German
relations in the 1970s.
Gerd Horten

Seth Howes (howes@oakland.edu) is Assistant Professor of German at Oakland Univer-

sity. He received his PhD in German from the University of Michigan in Spring 2012,
and is currently working on a book project which studies the theory and practices of
committed authorship in the Cold War cultures of divided Germany.
Ari Linden (ari.linden@ku.edu) is a visiting assistant professor of German at the Univer-

sity of Kansas.He received his PhD from Cornell University in 2013 and is currently
working on a book that addresses the theoretical stakes of satire in twentieth-century
German and Austrian drama.
(btautz@bowdoin.edu) is Associate Professor at Bowdoin College. Author
of Reading and Seeing Ethnic Differences in the Enlightenment: From China to Africa
and editor of Colors 1800/1900/2000: Signs of Ethnic Difference, she is working on
a new book, Translating the World: Remaking Late Eighteenth-century Literature
between Hamburg and Weimar.
Birgit Tautz

(rweikart@csustan.edu) is Professor of History at California State
University, Stanislaus. He has published four books, including Hitler’s Ethic: The
Nazi Pursuit of Evolutionary Progress (2009) and From Darwin to Hitler (2004).
He is currently working on a book on Hitler’s religion.
Richard Weikart

German Studies Review 36.3 (2013): 749 © 2013 by The German Studies Association.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.

